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Donald K. Swearer Control and freedom: The structure of
Buddhist meditation in the Pali suttas

Of all forms of religious practice, none exemplifies Buddhism better than the
practice of meditation. Anesaki and Takakusu claim that meditation is " ... the
universal method of mental culture of all Indian religious schools," 1 and Edward Conze writes, "meditational practices constitute the very core of the
Buddhist approach to life .... On the way to Nirvava they serve to promote
spiritual development, to diminish the impact of suffering, to calm the mind
and to reveal the true facts of existence." 2
This article is an attempt to analyze the structure of Buddhist meditation
within the Pali suttas. Our contention is that this structure is built around two
foci-control and freedom. The ultimate aim of Buddhist meditation is freedom from the bondage of attachment to sense objects. This liberating state of
being is reached through a process of consciousness control ( samiidhi) and
insight into the real nature of the world ( vipassanii). While Theravada Buddhism tends to distinguish samiidhi and vipassanii as two separate types of
meditation, both aim to achieve enlightenment ( sambodha). Furthermore, as
this article will show, they may be seen as basically complementary rather than
as mutually exclusive methods.
The structure of Buddhist meditation, which emerges from a study of the
Pali suttas, may be depicted by an hourglass figure3 :
The path to enlightenment begins with a general awareness and proceeds to
a greater and greater degree of consciousness refinement. This process produces decreasing degrees of attachment to the world of sense objects. The
jhiinas represent a transition from a narrowing of consciousness to its eventual
expansion resulting in a condition of "hedonic neutrality," that is, upekkhii.
In this state the consciousness is totally freed ( cetovimutti) from those conditions which qualify ordinary states of mind. It is characterized as immeasurable, nothingness, emptiness, and signless. In this mind-freed state, the
knowledge of enlightenment (paiiiiavimutti) is fully realized. Or, in a better
known idiom, one has attained nibbiina.
SATI AND MINDFUL AWARENESS

The process of meditation and the control of consciousness begin with sati
and sampajaiiiia, two practically inseparable terms in the Pali canon. 4 They
are widely discussed in the Pifakas and later commentaries, and according to
Dot1ald K. Swearer is Associate Professor of Religion at Swarthmore College.
Masaharu Anesaki and Junjiro Takakusu, "Dhyana," Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, ed. James A. Hastings, vol. 4 (New York: Scribner, 1912), p. 702.
2 Edward Conze, Buddhist Meditation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 11.
3 For a different model see Conze, Buddhist Meditation, p. 16.
4 The meaning of sati and sampajaiiiia came to be nearly synonymous. Sampajaiiiia is
formed from the verb, pa-janati
sam meaning to come to know altogether, hence, to
discriminate and comprehend.
1
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a contemporary Buddhist one of the suttas devoted entirely to an exposition
of sati and sampajanna is among the most highly respected and frequently
memorized Buddhist texts in Ceylon. 5 The Pali word sati is related to Sanskrit smrti, meaning "remembered" or "recollected." In Hinduism the word
has come to stand for a body of "remembered" literature (for example, the
Epics, sutras, Pural)aS) in contrast to "revealed" or sruti texts (for example,
Samitas, BrahmatJas, Upani~ads). The term in Pali has taken on, not only
the connotation of something called to mind or remembered, but also mindfulness, intentness of mind, or wakefulness. 6 Nyal)aponika interprets sati as
"bare attention" and sampajanna as "clear comprehension." 7 Sati as bare attention has a threefold value of helping the mind to know, shape, and liberate
itsel£. 8 Its knowing function is to analyze the objects of existence through dissection and discrimination and realize the conditioned and conditioning nature
of all phenomenal entities. Sati shapes individual's lives by causing reflective
action rather than immediate responses. Thus the mind gains a new power
and a new freedom from control by habitual action-response. As Nyal)aponika
expresses it, "Right Mindfulness recovers for man the lost pearl of his freedom
snatching it from the jaws of the dragon Time."9 The third value of sati is
the freeing of the mind. Paradoxically the control of attention and reflection
liberates the mind rather than confining it, for it is sati that produces the insight (vipassana) into the true nature of things. This realization leads to
detachment from ordinary preoccupation with the objects and goals of the
mundane world.
If sati, or bare attention, is a discipline of the consciousness appropriate to
the act of meditation itself, sampajanna can be understood as the integration
of sati with right knowledge ( ntitJa) or wisdom (panna) . S ampajaiiiia is applied to intentionality and action in particular, and more generally to the
awareness that at no time is there an abiding personality or ego behind one's
intentions and actions. The sampajanna dimension of mindfulness emphasizes
the fact that the fundamental nonbeingness ( anatta) of life is not limited to
a serene moment of detached and quiet meditation, but conditions every act
and thought of the individual.
Within the Nikayas there are three suttas devoted entirely to a discussion
of sati and sampajaiiiia: the Mahlisatipa!fhana Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya,
The Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipafthana Sutta), trans. Nya!}asatta Thera (Kandy,
Ceylon: The Buddhist Publication Society, 1960).
6 Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary (London: Luzac & Co., 1959), p. 672 (hereafter cited as Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English
Dictionary).
7 Nya!}aponika Thera, The Hearl of Buddhist Meditation (London: Rider & Co., 1962),
p. 30 (hereafter cited as Nyal}aponika, The Heart).
8 Ibid., p. 34.
9 Ibid., p. 41.
5
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the Satipaf!hlina Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya and the forty-seventh chapter
of the S mnyutta N ikiiya (Kindred Sayings on the Arisings of Mindfulness).
The first Sutta in particular will serve as our guide for a more detailed exposition of sati.
The Mahlisatipatthlina Suttanta is nearly identical with the Satipa[tana
Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya with the exception of an exposition of the
Four Noble Truths at its conclusion. We are told at the beginning of this
dialogue that the only path leading to the purification of beings, of passing
beyond grief and lamentation, of the dying out of suffering and misery and
the realization of nibbiina is the fourfold setting up of mindfulness.H1 In order
to come to grips with the full dimension of sati these four stages of mindfulness must be analyzed.
In the first place, mindfulness demands a control of the body (kiiya)
which overcomes the desire and misery typical of the world.U This end is
accomplished by practices of meditation and concentration. The bhikkhu is
to isolate himself, assume a posture of meditation, and practice breathing
exercises with a total consciousness of every act so that the bodily organism
will be tranquilized. 12
Mindfulness of the body begins with awareness of respiration. The Buddhist preoccupation with respiration exercises represents a continuity with
earlier Indian thought. In the late f!.g Veda and the Briihmal)as, breath was
one of the objects of cosmogonic speculation, the life force through which it
was thought the world might have come into being. 13 Breathing exercises
(prii1Jiiyiima) also played an important role in Hindu hatha yoga. There the
practice was eventually to arrest the movement of inhalation and exhalation.
The purpose of breath control in yoga, however, was not merely to gain
power over respiratory functions but access to higher states of consciousness.
Thus Bhoja's commentary on the Yoga Sutras of Patafijali reads: "All the
functions of the organs being preceded by that of respiration-there being
always a connection between respiration and consciousness in their respective
functions-respiration, when all the functions of the organs are suspended,
realizes concentration of consciousness on a single object." 14
Breathing exercises as the initiation of sati seem to have a dual function
not unlike that in the practice of ha[ha yoga, namely, to engender control
over the body but also to produce an awareness of the real nature of the
10 The Digha Nikaya, 3 vols., eds., T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter (London:
Luzac & Co., 1890-1911) 2:290.
11 Ibid., p. 291.
12 Ibid.
13 For example, see f!.g Veda 10: 129.
14 Quoted in Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, trans. Willard R. Trask
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 55.
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body. As NyaQaponika Thera observes, the mindfulness of breathing is both
a subject for "tranquility-meditation" ( samathabhavana) as well as an act
used for the development of insight ( vipassanabhtivana) .1 1>
Following the initiation of mindfulness through breathing exercises, the
Mahtisatipa!fhiina Suttanta moves to contemplation of various aspects of
the body and its functions. They are in brief: ( 1) mindfulness of bodily
postures (2) contemplation of the parts of the body ( 3) reflection on the
constituent elements of the body, and ( 4) the so-called cemetery contemplations. Turning first to the mindfulness of bodily postures the bhikkhu is
enjoined to contemplate (anupassanli) the body internally and externally as
something that comes into being and passes away again. 16 Furthermore,
such contemplation should accompany every act so that " ... when [the bhikkhu] is walking, [he] is aware of it thus: -'I walk' ; or when he is standing,
or sitting, or lying down, he is aware of it." 17 The purpose of the mindfulness
of the bodily postures is to gain the knowledge ( fiti1Ja) that he dwells independent, grasping after nothing in the world. 18 Awareness of bodily postures,
therefore, should produce such a total self-awareness in the adept that "In
going, standing, sitting, sleeping, watching, talking or keeping silence he
knows ( sampajlina) what he is doing." 19 This total self-knowledge is directed
toward two ends: (1) an acknowledgment of the impermanence of the body
(its arising and decay) and (2) an independence (anissito) from any attachment to the phenomenal world.
The contemplation of the parts of the body is an extension of mindfulness
regarding the body and its functions. It begins with an enumeration of various physical organs and bodily products ranging from hair to the heart to
urine. This description of the body and its parts is likened to a bag filled with
various kinds of grain which can be separated out and identified: " ... And
a keen-eyed man ... reflects as he pour(s) them out:-'that's rice, that's
paddy, those are beans,' and so forth. Even so, bhikkhus, does a brother
reflect on the body from the soles of the feet below upward to the crown
of the head, as something enclosed in skin and full of divers impurities."20
Reflection on the parts of the body becomes even more discriminating or
analytical, however. From physical parts, the bhikkhu moves his attention
to the fundamental bases ( dhtitu) or constituent elements of which the body
is composed. In the Theravada scheme of things these basic elements are
NyaJ:)aponika, The Heart, p. 63.
The Digha Nikilya, 2:292.
The Dialogues of the Buddha (Digha Nikaya), 3 vols., trans. T. W. Rhys Davids and
C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London: Luzac & Co., 1899-1959), 4th ed., 2:329 (hereafter cited
as Dialogues).
1s The Digha Nikaya, 2:292.
19 Ibid.
20 Dialogues, 2:330.
Hi
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four-earth, water, heat, and air. Mindfulness of the fact that the body is
composed of these elements is likened to the butcher who, when he has slain
an ox, displays the carcass piece by piece. 21 There appears to be a twofold
purpose behind the development of mindfulness regarding the various parts
and constituent elements of the body: ( 1) the knowledge that no abiding ego
exists in the body but only those parts that can be observed and inferred from
this observation and (2) the essentially "vile" and impermanent nature of
the body.
This second purpose is carried to even greater extremes in the fourth
aspect of bodily mindfulness, the cemetery contemplations. Here the bhikkhu
is enjoined to contemplate his own body as though it were undergoing ever
increasing degrees of decomposition after death. Initially he contemplates a
body abandoned in a graveyard which is swollen and turning black and blue;
then a body which has been partially eaten by wild animals; and finally a
body which has been reduced to a mere heap of bones. 22 All of these contemplations are symbols of the transient nature of the body. 23
The second stage of mindfulness is to arrive at the same degree of awareness of the true nature of the feelings ( vedanii) as was developed by the
body. The bhikkhu must be able to distinguish among feelings that are pleasurable ( sukha), painful ( dukkha), or neutral as well as feelings concerning
either spiritual ( siimisa) or material ( niramisa) things. 24 All of these types
of vedanii are subject to arising and dying away, just as is the body; hence,
they are transient, ephemeral. Mindfulness of feelings, consequently, just as
mindfulness regarding the body, produces a detachment, an independence
from the things of this world.
After subjecting the body ( kaya) and the feelings ( vedanii) to the kind
of objective scrutiny that leads to an understanding of their true nature, the
bhikkhu developing mindfulness turns his attention to citta, " . . . the everchanging, ever-active continuance of consciousness, or reacting intelligence"25
Ibid., p. 331.
The Digha Nikaya, 2:294-297.
23 The preoccupation of early Buddhism with the notion of death offers some interesting
possibilities of interpretation other than the rather obvious one given in the text. It
might, for instance, be an outgrowth of archaic shamanistic practices, for the shaman is
one who above all else is qualified by a knowledge of death. On this point see Mircea
Eliade, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, trans. Willard R. Trask (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 509£ (hereinafter cited as Eliade, Shamanism). On
the other hand, in the dialectic between the sacred and the profane, death plays a very
important role. For example, as Van Gennep and others point out, rites of initiation
marking a passage from a "profane" state to a "sacred" state are not infrequently signaled by a symbolic recreation of death on the part of the initiate. Arnold Van Gennep,
The Rites of Passage (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 75f.
24 The Digha Nikaya, 2:298.
25 Dialogues, 2:325.
21
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and also to dhamma, the ideas, cognizable objects or presentations beyond the
stage of mere sensory reaction. 26 Regarding the citta or conscious thinking
process the monk must become aware of its various modes, for example,
lustful, dull, intelligent, attentive, or distrait. That this awareness or knowledge of the states of the mind is for the purpose of control is illustrated by
the following passage from the Vitakkasanthana Sutta of the Majjhima
Nikaya:
... if while the monk is attending to the thought function and form of those
thoughts, there still arise evil unskilled thoughts associated with desire and
associated with aversion and associated with confusion, . . . that monk, his
teeth clenched, his tongue pressed against his palate, should by his mind subdue, restrain and dominate his mind ( citta) .27

Through awareness directed toward the mind, the monk is enabled both to
understand and subdue or control the mind or consciousness (citta). It is
recognized that citta as well as kaya and vedana comes into being but then
passes away. 28
Regarding the dhamma or ideas, the Mahasatipa!fhana Suttanta specifically
mentions five groups: (1) the five hindrances (nivaratta), (2) the five groups
( khandha), ( 3) the five spheres of sense ( ayatana), ( 4) the seven factors of
enlightenment and, ( 5) the four Aryan truths. All of these groups of dhamma
are to be reflected upon with the same scrutiny as body, feelings, and mind
with the intent purpose of leading the monk to an independence where he
grasps after nothing in the world.
Directing his attention toward the five aggregates ( khandha), the bhikkhu
considers individually their arising and passing away until in a state of nongrasping he attains to mindfulness. Contemplating the six ayatanas or the
internal and external spheres of sense, the monk is made aware that any
fetters that bind him to the world are a result of the coming together of the
organs of sense and the objects of sense. By his analysis he becomes of the
arising and the putting aside of all fetters. Of the seven factors of enlightenment the bhikkhu must grow aware " ... if they are subjectively present, or
absent, and he is aware of how there comes an uprising of any factor not
hitherto uprisen, and of how there comes a full development of such factors
when it has arisen." 29 Finally the Mahasatipa!fhana Suttanta expounds the
four Aryan truths, which must also be considered in terms of the same pattern of their arising and passing away.
What in belief is the purpose of sati-sampajaiiiia? In general terms mindIbid.
The Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikaya), 3 vols., trans. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1954-1959), 1:155.
2s The Digha Nikaya, 2:299.
29 Dialogues, 2:336.
26

27
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fulness produces a profound self-awareness. More specifically it is intended
to produce a detachment from the world of sense through controlling the
sensory inputs, and realizing the fundamental impermanence or nonbeingness
( anattii) of existence. Mindfulness, therefore, offers both a theoretical and
practical means for the ". . . realization of that liberating truth of no-self
( anattii), having the two aspects of egolessness and voidness of substance."30
This realization is a "lived understanding." That is, it is arrived at through
a carefully graded program in which control of the senses is coupled with an
objective, discriminating knowing. The method of mindfulness conjoins psychomental programming, epistemological shifts, and ontological transformation. It lays the groundwork for later developments, in the meditative life.
SAMADHI AND ONEPOINTEDNESS

Samadhi represents a greater degree of control over the mind or consciousness ( citta, viniiiit:a) than sati. As the word itself ( sam-a-dha) denotes,
samadhi is a bringing together, a concentration of the mind in contrast to
the more general practice of mindfulness ( sati). In early Buddhism the important relationship between samiidhi as the process whereby one concentrates
his thoughts and controls his consciousness and s'ila or the ethical and moral
behavior of the religious man is a general assumption. For our purposes,
however, samadhi has crucial implications for the higher goals of the salvation-quest.
In the Subha Sutta of the Digha Nikaya the young Brahman, Subha, asks
Ananda to expound the doctrine regarding samadhi. The resulting answer
includes elements which overlap with other categories of this exposition, but
several points are made which will serve as a basis for our discussion of
samiidhi.
In the first place the sutta affirms that one practices samiidhi by guarding
the doors of the senses.31 This particular practice is described as follows:
when the monk sees an object with his eye he is not grasped either by its
general appearance or by its details ; he restrains whatever factor might cause
the arising of evil elemental reactions ; so restraining his sense of sight he
attains mastery over his sense of sight.32 In a similar fashion he controls his
other sense organs: " ... when he hears a sound with his ear, or smells an
odor with his nose or tastes a flavor with his tongue or feels a touch with
his body, or cognizes ( viiinaya) a phenomenon ( dhamma) with his mind
he is not grasped either by the general appearance or the details of it."33 By
so Nyal}aponika, The Heart, p. 75.
31 The Digha Niktiya, 1:207, alsop. 70.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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so restraining all of his senses, including the manas or conscious mind, he
experiences an unblemished happiness. Having so restrained and guarded all
the sense organs so that no element ( dhamma) of the mundane world may
claim him, the bhikkhu is now mindful (sati) and with clear comprehension
( sampajaiiiia). As described in the Subha Sutta, therefore, samlidhi begins
when the senses are no longer subject to the rule of the objects of sense.
In the Cu!avedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya the layman Visakha asks
the nun Dhammadinna, "What is concentration ( samadhi), what are the
distinguishing marks of concentration, what is the development of concentration ?"34 To this question the wise nun replies that samlidhi is onepointedness
of mind ( cittassa ekaggatii), its marks the four objects of mindfulness, its
requisites the four right efforts and that whatever leads to the increase of
these is, in effect, the development of concentration.311 This passage points to
the close relationship between sati and samiidhi. That is, concentration appears to presuppose the four objects of mindfulness. Samlidhi, however, goes
beyond the awareness of impermanence and sensory detachment produced by
sati. It is a refined control of the consciousness, a concentration of the mind
to a single point, thereby eliminating all extraneous thoughts. Buddhaghosa
in applying the definition cittassa ekaggata to samlidhi elaborates as follows:
" [ samadhi] is the centering of the consciousness and consciousness-concomitants evenly and rightly on a single object."36 The man of concentrated
( samadhi) and one-pointed ( ekaggata) mind, therefore, stands in stark contrast to the profane man who is "empty-headed, frivolous and loose in talk." 37
The Cu!avedalla Sutta's exposition of samadhi also says that the requisites
of concentration are the four right efforts. The four right efforts are described
in various parts of the Nikayas as follows: checking the rise of evil and wrong
states of consciousness not yet arisen ; shedding evil and wrong states that
have already arisen ; encouraging the rise of right states not yet arisen;
ensuring that right states which are already there shall be multiplied and
developed. 38 The four right efforts are frequently mentioned as one of the
formula truths reported to have been perceived by the Buddha and passed
on to his disciples. 3 9 While this formula does indeed point to a relationship
between samadhi and the production and retention of right constituent states
of conscious being, it raises the broader issue of the place of samiidhi in a
The Middle Length Sayings, 1:363.
The Majjhirna Nikiiya, 3 vols., ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, and C. A. F. Rhys
Davids (London: Luzac & Co., 1888-1899), 1:295.
36 Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), trans. Bhikkhu Nal)amoli
(Colombo, Ceylon: R. Semage, 1956), p. 85.
87 The Book of Gradual Sayings (Ang ttara-Nikaya), 5 vols., trans. F. L. Woodward
and E. H. Hare (London: Oxford University Press, 1932-1936), 5:65.
38 The Majjhima Nikaya, 2:11.
39 For example, see The Digha Nikllya, 2:120.
34

35
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variety of conceptual structures illustrative of an enlightened state of mind.
For instance all of the five iddhipiidas, the paths to the attainment of supranormal powers, are dependent on samiidhi. 40 The five forces ( indriyani) or
organs of spiritual sense include samiidhi which is described by one Buddhist
scholar as "the dominant faculty, which brings about concentration of thoughts
and makes the adept rise higher and higher in meditations." 41 Samiidhi is
also the sixth of the seven factors leading to enlightenment, 42 and it has
already been pointed out that concentration is one of the three major divisions of the Noble Eightfold Path. On the basis of the crucial role played
by samiidhi in the formulae cited, it is arguable that concentration of mind is
the necessary step to the attainment of a higher truth and the powers accompanying it.
The Buddhist adept who chooses the way of samiidhi begins his religious
quest with a general awareness of the nature of the self and reality but must
move beyond the state of objective detachment produced by this mindfulness.
He must progress to a unity of concentration which eliminates the flow of
sensory material into his conscious mind. By such a concentrated effort he
is able to rise to higher forms of apperception, to a mystic intuition of a reality veiled to ordinary perception.43
JHANA, STAGES TO THE ULTIMATE

Buddhist meditation progresses from samiidhi to jhiina, or from concentration
and onepointedness to the gradual expansion of the consciousness to hithertofore unexperienced dimensions. In the Pali Suttas, jhiina is often found as
part of the formula of the four jhlinas, where it is translated as mental absorption or trance. By carefully analyzing this formula and the contexts in
which it occurs, the significance of jhana in relationship to the control of
consciousness and saving-knowledge will become clear.
In the Brahmajiila Sutta a discussion of the four jhiinas occurs within the
context of the question, "How may the self or soul ( atta) attain to the highest Nibbana in this visible world?" It is in answer to this question that an
explication of the four jhanas is set forth.
4() The five iddhipiJdas are resolution ( chanda), effort ( viriya), consciousness ( citta),
and investigation (vima1f!Sc'i). The Digha Nikaya, 3:77.
41 Nalinaksha Dutt, Early Monastic Buddhism, rev. ed. (Calcutta: Oriental Book Agency,
1960), p. 248.
42 The seven factors or limbs of enlightenment (sambojjhanga) are: sati, dhammavicaya,
viriya, piti, passaddhi, samadhi, and upekkhli.
43 The process of mental training became greatly elaborated in the scholastic or Abhidhamma period of Theravada Buddhism. Nalinaksha Dutt provides an excellent discussion
of the various fonns of samlidhi (as represented in particular by the Vissuddhimagga) in
chapter 7 of Early Monastic Buddhism.
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In this sutta it is accepted as an a priori condition of phenomenal existence
that the self is subject to kama or sensuous desires. It is also the case that
sensuous desires are characterized by impermanence ( anicca). Phenomenal
existence, therefore, necessarily involves suffering since sensory pleasures are
constantly subject to change. The only way one can hope to achieve happiness
and joy (pUisukha) is by cutting off kama. In the first jhana this state is
accomplished by detachment ( viveka) accompanied by reflection and investigation ( vitakka-vicara). In order to understand this jhana these three terms
must be studied in some detail.
The term viveka has a threefold significance: a physical separation from
the world in the sense of "seclusion"; an intellectual separation in the sense
of "discrimination" ; and an ethical separation in the sense of the mind ( citta)
"being separate from the world." 44 For instance, in the Mahasuiiiiata Sutta
the Buddha tells Ananda that a bhikkhu who delights in society cannot enjoy
well-being or emancipation of mind ( cetovimutti) but that such happiness
demands renunciation, solitude, and enlightenment ( sambodha) .45 The Buddha claims that as a Tathagata he has reached such a state of isolation
( viveka) by dismissing thoughts of all attendant phenomena and by developing and dwelling in a state of emptiness ( suiiiiata) .46 The sutta goes on to
say that a monk who likewise desires to develop and dwell in inward emptiness should calm, tranquilize, focus and concentrate his mind inwardly. 47
This sutta clearly indicates that viveka implies both a physical separation
from the delights of ordinary worldly intercourse as well as an isolation of
the mind ( citta). It is interesting to note that the resultant separation is
described as a condition of inward emptiness ( suiiiiata) since in the later
Madhyamika tradition the perspective on this important term will shift from
a psychophysical emphasis to an ontological one.
In the Na!akapana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, viveka is described in
terms of separation from sensuous desires and from the evil constituents of
being. This separation is said to result in the attainment of joy and happiness.
The Tathagata who has reached such a state has overcome the attachments
to the mundane world known as the asavas, which produce the suffering of
"birth, old age and death." 48 Viveka, then, means a detachment from the
world of sense with its accompanying desires and kammic resultants of
rebirth.
The terms vitakka and vicara should be taken together. In fact T. W. Rhys
Davids contends that by examining the use of these two words in earlier
The Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:84 (see the footnote).
The Majjhima Nikiiya, 3:110.
46 Ibid., 3: 111.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 1 : 464.
44

45
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and later works, one concludes that they once had synonymous meanings. 49
They came to have slightly different intentions, however, with vitakka referring in particular to initial thought or observation and vicara denoting continuing or sustained investigation and reflection. Together they are used to
indicate" ... the whole of the mental process of thinking." 50
In the Upakkilesa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya both vitakka and vicara
are related to concentration ( samadhi). The Buddha is recorded as saying
that by developing samadhi in several modes beginning with vitakka and
vicara, he gained the knowledge ( iiiitJa) and the vision ( dassana) that his
final liberation ( vimutti) was assured. V itakka and vicara, therefore are important to the concentration (samadhi) of one's thoughts and act as one of
the first steps toward the attainment of the apperception ( dassana) of ultimate reality. They share with viveka the characteristics of directing the individual away from mere sensory reality. Thus in the Dasuttara Suttanta of
the Digha N ikaya the eight thoughts ( vitakka) of the great man ( mahapurisa) include the limitation of desires, detachment, and mental concentration.111
As we shall see, however, vitakka can become dangerous. As the Sakkapaiiha
Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya points out, vitakka can become a mental preoccupation which causes desire ( chanda), 52 the root of attachment to the
mundane world. 53
In sum, the first jhiina is depicted primarily as a condition of detachment.
It involves a physical, intellectual, and ethical separation from the phenomenal
world. An important phase of the development of the concentration necessary
to acquire the first jhiina is careful thought and analysis of one's self and the
surrounding world.
The second jhiina is achieved when observation and investigation ( vitakka
and vicara) are suppressed. In this stage these two mental functions are said
to be ofarika or gross, implying that they are necessarily involved in the
empirical world. The second jhiina is characterized by joy and happiness
(pitisukha), born not of viveka or detachment but of samadhi, translated by
Rhys Davids in this passage as "serenity."54 This state is further characterized by a tranquil inner nature and a concentrated mind or heart.55
Just as the first jhiina was labeled gross ( o!arika) since it involved vitakka
and vicara, the second acquires the same rubric because it is characterized by
Rhys-Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 620.
Ibid.
51 The Dialogues of the Buddha, 3:261.
52 In this particular case, chanda or excitement is nearly identical in meaning with
thirst or craving.
53 The Digha Nikaya, 2:277. Dialogues, 2:311.
54 Dialogues, 1:50.
55 The Digha Nikaya, 1:37.
49

50
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joy (piti) and an exhilaration of the heart.116 The qualities which are found
in one who attains to the third jhana are equanimity ( upekkha) and mindfulness ( sati), "self-possession" ( sampajiina), dispassion ( viriiga), and an abiding happiness. Finally in the fourth jhana the attention of the heart on
happiness is transcended as is a concern with its opposite, dukkha or suffering.57 Similarly the polarity of somanassa and domanassa or mental distress
is overcome. The last jhiina is, therefore, composed of pure equanimity and
mindfulness ( upekkhiisatiparisuddhi) 58 and is "a state where some maintain
the complete happiness, in the visible world, of a living being."5 9
The fourfold jhiina formula appears again in the Siimaiiiiaphala Sutta, the
discourse on the fruits of the life of a samatJa or recluse. In this sutta the discussion of the jhiinas is preceded by an overcoming of the five hindrances or
nivara1;1as and is followed by the acquisition of supranormal powers or iddhi
and abhinnii ( supranormal knowledge) as well as the overcoming of the
lisavas. To understand more fully the role of jhiina within the scope of Buddhist soteriology, we shall examine in some detail the most important of the
concepts in this sutta, namely, nivara1Ja, iddhi, abhinnii, and iisava.
The classical formula of the five nivara1;1as60 as found in the S amannaphala
Sutta and elsewhere in the Nikayas (for example, Digha III, 49) is described
as follows: ( 1) coveting the world, ( 2) malevolence and the desire to injure,
( 3) stolidity and slothfulness, ( 4) excitement and misdeeds and ( 5) wavering or doubt. 61 One must overcome these hindrances so that in each case the
mind may be purified. Separated from sensuous desires and evil elemental
impulses the sama1Ja is enabled to enter into the sequence of the four jhanas
previously described. 62 With the exception of the fifth nivara1Ja the concern
of this formula is clearly with those emotions which tend toward unreflective
involvement in the phenomenal world. As Smhyutta Nikiiya 5:83 puts it, the
nivara1;1as are conducive ". . . to the still more becoming and growth
thereof." 63 Involvement in the becoming of the phenomenal world supposes
lack of insight or ignorance described as blindness and loss of sight. One
who has not overcome the nivara1;1as obviously is unable to acquire any degree of knowledge beyond that granted through the agency of the senses in
dependence on the empirical world.
56

Ibid.

57 Ibid., 1:37-38.
Ibid., 1:38.
Dialogues, 1:51.
60 Nivarat_~a is the Sanskrit nis
varat_~a literally meaning not choosing or unable to
choose and, hence, an obstacle or hindrance.
61 The Dlgha Nikaya, 1:71.
62 Ibid., 1:73.
63 The Book of Kindred Sayings (Samyutta-Nikaya), 5 vols., trans. C. A. F. Rhys Davids
and F. L. Woodward (London: Oxford University Press, 1917-1930), 5:70.
58
59

+
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The Samannaphala Sutta makes clear, however, that one who passes
through the jhanas transcends an ordinary involvement in the phenomenal
world exemplified by the nivaranas. Through attaining the four jhtinas the
consciousness or mind ( citta) is made pure ( parisuddha), freed from blemish, devoid of evil ( kilesa), 64 stable and immovable. 65 The citta is thereby
freed to direct itself toward the "insight that comes from knowledge." 66 This
insight is simply that this body ( kaya) has a form ( rupa) composed of the
four great elements; that it is a result of a human birth; that it is perpetuated
by partaking of foods; that it is impermanent and subject to dissolution and
disintegration ; and that consciousness itself ( vifiiia1Ja) depends on the body
and is bound up with it. 67 With the citta purified and collected, the sama1Ja
has the mental power to be able to create (maya) with it another body ( afiiia
kaya) than the body subject to the frailties described above. As the text
describes this process it is " ... as if a man were to pull out a reed from its
sheath. He would know: 'this is the reed, this the sheath. The reed is one
thing, the sheath another. It is from the sheath that the reed has been drawn
forth.' And similarly were he to take a snake out of its slough, or draw a
sword from its scabbard.'' 68
The notion of manomaya or mental power has significant possibilities for
this study; however, on the basis of the Pali texts it is difficult to arrive at
a specific interpretation. In general the term denotes being made or formed
by the mind, particularly as though magically made. 69 For example, the Brahmajala Sutta refers to the evolution of the world system to the point where
most beings have been reborn in the "World of Radiance" and "there they
dwell made of mind (manomaya), feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves, traversing the air [and] continuing in glory .... " 70 A similar association of manomaya with a heavenly realm is found in the Apatttzaka Sutta
of the Majjhima Nikaya. There it is stated that the corporeal gods are a
product of manomaya. 71 The two passages cited above clearly refer to the
64 The word, kilesa, along with other terms such as the nivarat~a, tat~hti, the tisava, etc.,
has reference to unthinking involvement in the phenomenal or profane world. Kilesa
literally means stain, soil, impurity and comes to stand for sensuous desires, passions,
etc. "Its occurrence in the Pitakas is rare; in later works, very frequent, where it is
approx. tantamount to our terms lower or unregenerate nature . . . ." Rhys Davids and
Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 216.
65 The D'igha Nikaya, 1:76.
66 Dialogues, 1:86.
67 The D'igha Niktiya, 1:76. We find here a standard description of the body. Consciousness (vinntit~a) in this instance indicates the five senses or the entire emotional and intellectual process. See Dialogues, 1:87, notes 1 and 2.
68 Dialogues, 1:88.
69 Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 521.
70 Dialogues, 1:30. The D'igha Nikaya, 1:17.
71 The Majjhima Nikaya, 1:410.
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magical power of the mind by relating manomaya to the mythological realms
of Buddhism. Indeed, manomaya's earliest meaning may have been magically
oriented-the notion that mano was responsible for the attainment of heavenly
rewards of some form or another; however, we find that manomaya comes to
assume both ethical and ontic connotations.
For instance, the Dhammapiida opens with the following two verses:
Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they.
If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows one,
even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox.
Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are
they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, because of that, happiness follows
one, even as one's shadow that never leaves.
In this passage the ethical and the ontic are definitely related in terms of
mind, that is, the mind appears as the center point. It has, as it were, the power
to create the "self." The ethical dimension stems from this fact. If the mind
is ignorant and impure, one will suffer; if, on the other hand, the mind is
enlightened and pure, one will attain happiness.
Having overcome the five hindrances, attained the four mental absorptions
and the power of manomaya, the samatJa now acquires iddhi or supranormal
power, and abhiiina or supranormal knowledge. The term iddhi is of preBuddhistic origin. In different contexts it may be used in the Pali texts to
describe the potency of a king, a rich noble, a hunter, etc.72 In the Siimaiiiiaphala Sutta, eight modes of iddhi are mentioned: ( 1) the power of becoming
one or many, (2) the ability to become invisible, (3) passing through objects
such as walls and hills, ( 4) penetrating through solid ground, ( 5) the power
to walk on water, (6) traveling cross-legged in the sky, (7) touching the
moon and the sun, (8) reaching Brahma heaven. 73
The above listed iddhis acquired by the Buddhist adept have striking similarities with the archaic phenomenon of shamanism.74 The coincidence of characteristics between these two religious practitioners has been studied by Mircea
Eliade in his monograph, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstacy.75 In
particular he points to the "identity in expression" between the superhuman
experiences of the Buddhist yogin and the archaic symbolism of ascent and
flight found so frequently in shamanism.76 Symbols of ascent and flight are
especially important since they illustrate the ecstatic experience at which
Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 120.
Dialogues, 1:88-89.
74 Eliade notes that the word, shaman, is derived through the Russian from the Tungusic,
"saman." Some scholars, however, have derived the term from Pali. See Eliade, Shamanism, p. 495.
75 See chapter 11, "Shamanic Ideologies and Techniques Among the Indo-Europeans,"
in Eliade, Shamanism.
76P.409.
72
'1ll
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shamanism aims. The shaman through the medium of this experience obtains
a superhuman state of being enhancing him with such powers as flight, especially for the purpose of reaching otherworldly realms. The magical aspect of
this power is well illustrated by our particular text, which specifically indicates
that prior to the acquisition of iddhi, the samatJa has exercised the power of
manomaya, the "magic" of his mind, in order to create "another body." It
would appear that the iddhi which follow are powers of that "other body"
created as a result of passing through the four jhanas.
The possible shamanistic and, hence, magically oriented origin of iddhi is
furthered by what appears to be a growing suspicion on the part of early Buddhism toward the public display of paranormal or superhuman psychic powers.
In the Kevaddha Sutta of the Digha Nikilya the Buddha is represented as
warning against the use of magical wonders because they might be confused
with the use of magical charms practiced in Gandhara. 77 He is made to say,
"It is because I perceive danger in the practice of mystic wonders, that I
loath, and abhor, and am ashamed thereof." 78 In the Vinaya Pifaka it is stated
that a monk should not display psychic powers before the laity beyond the
powers of ordinary men. 79 The Sampasadaniya Sutta of the Digha Nikaya
makes it clear that there are indeed two types of iddhi, one which is termed
ignoble and the other noble. 80 The ignoble are those powers discussed above
in the Samaiiiiaphala Sutta and elsewhere in the Nikayas. 81 In the Sampasildaniya Sutta the iddhis are labeled ignoble since they are concomitant with
mental intoxicants and worldly aims. 82 In other words, it is possible to employ
the fruits of the jhilna or the iddhi in such a manner that the mundane world,
rather than being transcended, becomes even more attractive and one's involvement within it is deepened even further. lddhi produced through manamaya may become the occasion of a descent into the actual or phenomenal
world rather than ascent into the real or noumenal.
In contrast to the ignoble powers, all of which involve some superhuman
power, the Sampasadaniya Sutta describes the noble powers as follows: "When
a bhikkhu can, if he so desire, remain unconscious of the disgust amid what
is disgusting; or conscious of disgust amid what is not disgusting; or unconscious of disgust amid what is both disgusting and the opposite; or, avoiding
both that which is disgusting and the opposite, should remain indifferent to
them as such, mindful and understanding."83 As should be expected, the
The Dialogues of the Buddha, 1:278.
Ibid.
79 The Book of Discipline (Vinaya-Pitaka), 5 vols., trans. I. B. Horner, Sacred Books
of the Buddhists (London: Luzac & Co., 1940-1952), 2:112.
80 The Dfgha NiktJya, 3:112.
81 See the Kevaddha Sutta.
82 The Digha Nikaya, 3:112.
88 Dialogues, 3: 107.
77
78
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noble iddhis overcome the mental intoxicants ( ilsavas) and the worldly aims
instead of becoming further embroiled in them. Rather than representing the
superhuman or the magical, Aryan powers stand for control of saiiiiil or perceptions and lead to an indifference (upekhaka) toward the disgusting and
the nondisgusting, those polarities which qualify our perception of the phenomenal world.
The transformation of iddhi from an archaic, magical meaning is further
illustrated by the Janavasabha Suttanta of the Digha Nikilya describing the
four ways in which iddhi is developed. They are: concentration and effort with
desire ( chanda-samildhi), concentration and effort with energy ( viriya-samildhi), concentration and effort with a "dominant idea" ( citta-samadhi),
concentration and effort with investigation ( v'imatJtsil-samildhi) .84 Here we
find a progression not to a state of ecstasy leading to powers of invisibility and
flight, but rather a progression from desire ( chanda) to investigation ( v'imatJtsil), or from motivation and effort to a more refined and sophisticated use
of the mind. It appears that iddhi as the fruit of jhilna becomes, rather than
supernatural powers acquired in shamanistic trance, a discriminating understanding (vima1Jtsil) of the phenomenal world engendering a detached objectivity ( upekhaka) in the face of the polarities of impure/pure, loathsome/
nonloathsome, disgusting/nondisgusting typical of the phenomenal or mundane
world.
In addition to iddhi, the Samaiiiiaphala Sutta indicates that other powers
are acquired by the sama~a who has overcome the n'ivara~as and acquired the
jhanas. These powers are said to be the heavenly or divine ear; discernment
of various types of minds or citta; knowledge of previous existences ; the
heavenly or divine eye with which the adept " ... sees beings as they pass
away from one form of existence and take shape in another . . . ." 85 These
supranormal powers eventually developed into a stereotyped list of six abhiiiiiils (higher knowledge). They appear in the Dasuttara Suttanta of the
Digha Nikilya as follows: ( 1) the iddhis in their various modes described
above; (2) "deva-hearing" by which the adept "hears sounds both heavenly
and human, far and near" ; ( 3) a mind that ". . . understands the minds of
other beings, other persons ..." ; ( 4) an ability to recall to mind " ... the
various temporary states as he lived in days gone by ... "; ( 5) "deva-sight"
by which "he discerns the pageant of beings faring according to their deeds" ;
( 6) the realization and knowledge of the extinction of the "intoxicants"
(ilsavas) and the attainment of freedom. 86
We can discern in this list an amalgam of two different types of abhiiiiili.
In the first instance there is the type illustrated by the occurrence of the
84

The Digha Nikaya, 2:213.

811

Ibid., 1: 79£.
Ibid., 3:281. See also Dialogues, 3:257£.

86
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supranormal powers in the Siimannaphala Sutta. There the abhiiiiiiis are acquired as the result of jhana through the power of manomaya. In particular,
however, abhinna seems to express a psychic or mental power in contrast to
the extraordinary physical power of the iddhis. For example, the heavenly ear
and the divine eye would appear above all else to indicate a heightened mode
of perception enabling the adept to arrive at a supranatural knowledge bordering on omniscience. Thus iddhi and abhinna seem to complement each other,
the one pointing to physical power, the other to mental power. It is just such
a mutually supporting role, for example, that iddhi and abhinna play in the
Akankheyya Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya. 87
There is, on the other hand, another type of abhinnli in the Dasuttara Suttanta list, a "higher knowledge" of the destruction of all attachments to the
mundane and of the realization of ultimate reality or nibbana. This aspect of
the abhinnlis is found in the Samyutta Nikaya, where they are preceded by the
"middle path" and followed by enlightenment and nibbana. 88 Or, again in the
Anguttara Nikaya where it is said that the abhinnas lead to full emancipation,89 and the Digha where we find that they are contrary to priestly superstitions and vain (sophistical) speculations. 90 In other words, abhinnli, at this
level, is insight into the truth claims of Buddhism regarding the nature of
reality. It may be that the two seemingly different types of abhinnli represent
a synthesis of a more popular and "primitive," magically oriented tradition
with the more sophisticated, ethically oriented tradition of the priests. It is
difficult to assert, as the Pali Text Society Dictionary does, that the more
magically oriented understanding of abhinna is later. 91 Perhaps all that can
be safely said is that in the Nikayas the two traditions came to be amalgamated.
That is to say, it was expected that as a person gained detachment from the
phenomenal world he not only gained a "higher knowledge" ( abhi-jna), but
supranormal powers ( iddhis) as well.
Having destroyed the nivara~as, attained the jhiinas, the iddhis, and abhinfias, the Samaiinaphala Sutta goes on to say that the samanna is then able to
destroy the "deadly floods" or "intoxicants" ( lisavas) that are part of the
attachment of the profane man to the mundane world. In this sutta the iisavas
are enumerated as kama (sensual desire), bhava (becoming or desire for
future life), and avijja (ignorance of the four noble truths) .92 One of the
most famous passages referring to the intoxicants is contained in a formula
repeated throughout the Nikayas, the Mahiiparinibbiina Sutta in particular.
The Majjhima Nikaya, 1:33.
The Book of Kindred Sayings, 5:357.
89 The Book of Gradual Sayings, 4:179.
90 The Digha Nikaya, 3:131.
91 Rhys Davids and Stede, Pali-English Dictionary, p. 64.
92 The Digha Nikaya, 1:83.
87

88
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It illustrates the interrelationship of conduct ( s'ila), concentration ( samiidhi),
and understanding (paiiiili) in overcoming the lisavas. After affirming that
concentration must be accompanied by right conduct and understanding by
concentration, the passage concludes that the mind ( citta) of the individual
surrounded by a profound understanding (paiiiili) of the nature of reality will
be freed ( vimuccati) from being "poured out" ( lisava) into the mundane
world through sensual desires, the wish for a life of continual becoming, false
views, and ignorance of his true state of being.93
The lisavas, as do the n'ivara1Jas, serve to clarify that from which the jhlinas
free a man. Fundamentally it is the mundane, specifically as the world of
sensuous desire, becoming, anger, worry, dullness, stupidity; or, in other words,
ignorant, unthinking involvement in and attachment to the empirical world.
The jhlinas represent stages by which an individual attains a power of mind
( manomaya) which represents a new order of being, "another body" ( aiiiia
kliya) as the text states it. This new being is graphically illustrated by certain
powers the texts describe partially in the terms of a popular, magical tradition
and partially in terms of the higher knowledge represented by the Buddhist
analysis of existence. We may conclude that the jhanas preserve two types
of knowledge in relationship to the salvation quest: ecstasy and a mode of
knowledge characterized by v'imat}1sli, vitakka, and viclira or more rational and
discriminating forms of thinking. Knowledge as power, then, comes to take
on a rather particular meaning. It is power over the world of becoming and
change, but it is also the power of new being.
UPEKKHA AND THE UNLIMITEDS

We have seen in our discussion of jhana that upekkha (equanimity) appeared
in the third stage and that in the fourth there remained only sati (mindfulness) and upekkhli. Having discussed the former term, we now turn to an
examination of upekkhli. The word upekkhli is derived from the Sanskrit root
'ik~, meaning to gaze or look at, plus the prefix upa; hence, the word literally
means to overlook or neglect. 94 Its meaning is extended, however, to denote
patience, equanimity, or indifference. The Plili Text Society Dictionary defines upekkha as, "hedonic neutrality or indifference, the zero point between
joy and sorrow."95 A. B. Keith notes that upekkhli, as a quality of the third
and fourth jhana, does not actually connote a hedonistic sense of indifference
but rather an intellectual neutrality. Thus, upekkha, at least in its jhanic context, is an impartial tolerance in regard to all mental states. 96
Ibid., 2:81.
Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 215.
95 Rhys Davids and Stede, ?ali-English Dictionary, p. 150.
96 A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, 4th ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963), p. 126.
93
94
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A broad survey of the uses of upekkhii in the Theravada tradition is given
by Edward Conze as follows: ( 1) neutral feelings which are neither pleasant
nor unpleasant, (2) an attitude of "serene unconcern" or sameness of thought
arising from the practice of concentration or jhiina, ( 3) the final stage of
worldly wisdom just prior to reaching the Path when evenmindedness toward
all conditioned beings is achieved, ( 4) the equanimity of the Arahant who
retains a natural state of purity, ( 5) the equanimity of the Arahant as contrasted with the dull indifference of ignorant men, and (6) an attitude or
impartiality providing an antidote to ill will and sensuous greed. 97
In the Nikayas themselves we discover that upekkha is used frequently in
the formula of the four brahma vihiiras or the abodes of brahmii. The brahma
viharas are four "states of mind" that result, after death, in a rebirth in the
heavenly worlds of brahmii. 98 There is disagreement among Buddhist scholars
as to the origin of the brahma vihiiras. T. W. Rhys Davids contends that
they were almost certainly exclusively Buddhist,99 whereas E. J. Thomas believes they show a direct connection with Brahmanical practices since they
occur in the Yoga Sutras. 100 Regardless of origin, however, the brahma
viharas are important as modes of heightened awareness, although they are
not in themselves the highest goal of nibbtina. 101
Another term used in the Nikayas to define the brahma vihtiras is appamaiiiiii or "infinite feelings." 102 This term is applied to these states of mind or
categories of consciousness dealing with mind expansion. M ahasudassana
Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya reports the following attainments of "the Great
King of Glory" after reaching the fourth jhiina: "And he let his mind pervade
one quarter of the world with thoughts of love ; and so the second quarter
and so the third and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, to pervade
with heart of love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure, free from
the least trace of anger or ill will." 103 And in a similar fashion he pervaded the
whole world with a consciousness of compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. The brahma viharas in general and upekkha in particular represent,
if you will, universal states of consciousness. They are one of the somewhat
paradoxical outcomes of the process of meditation and the control of the mind
which has been described in the Nikayas, a process that becomes even more
97 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 89-90.
9BThe four brahma vihtiras are: love (metta), compassion (karu~;~ii), sympathetic joy
(muditii), and equanimity (upekkhii).
99 Dialogues, 1:298.
1oo Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, 2d ed. (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 50.
101 Ibid.
102 Appamaiiiiii corresponds to the Sanskrit priimli1Jya
the prefix, a, literally meaning

+

"not."
103

Dialogues, 2:219.
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refined in a later period. This outcome of Buddhist meditation is seemingly
paradoxical in that the progression from sati to samiidhi, and even into the
jhlinas, was primarily a narrowing down of the consciousness. But the narrowing of the consciousness was for the purpose of its ultimate liberation. The
refinement of the mind was important primarily for the elimination of attachment to the objects of sense and concomitantly to develop such mental control
that the mind developed the power to construct a new reality ( manomaya).
That is to say, the purpose of meditation in the Nikayas is to free the mind
from dependence on sensory objects so that it can be expanded to realities
which defy empirical definition. Upekkhii, therefore, becomes the last element
in the seven factors of enlightenment and is a characteristic shared by both
Arahants and buddhas.
Perhaps the significance of the difference in consciousness implied by upekkhli and ordinary states of consciousness can be best demonstrated by referring to two Nikaya texts. The Sa!ayatanavibhmiga Sutta of the Majjhima
Nikaya lists six indifferences (upekkhii). A worldly indifference is" ... the
indifference on seeing a thing which appertains to the ignorant and foolish
average man ... such indifference ... fails to transcend the thing seen ..." 104
By way of contrast the indifference of renunciation arises when " ... on discerning the transitory nature of things seen and their mutability, instability
and annihilation, indifference arises from causal understanding." 105 Upekkhii
denotes, therefore, a transcendence of the thing seen.
Assuming that meditation frees the mind from dependence on the mundane
world, to what is it freed? The answer must of necessity be in abstract terms,
and the person who is looking for a concrete definition of the knowledge of
ultimates is bound to be disappointed; however, one answer given by the
Nikayas is found in the Mahiivadella Sutta of the Majjhima Nikiiya. There,
in a conversation between Sariputta and Kotthita the Great, Sariputta discusses four "freedoms" of the mind ( cetovimutti) : appamii1Jii (immeasurable),
iikincafifia (nothingness), sufifiatii (emptiness), animitta ( signless) .106 All
four of these characteristics of the cetovimutti are identical in that they connote a state or condition of nonattachment. They also point beyond themselves
to a reality beyond definition, a reality that can be known but not in the way
that people ordinarily know. The whole thrust of Buddhist meditation, therefore, is to produce a condition of consciousness in which ultimate reality can
be known directly, just as objects are perceived directly in the phenomenal
world. The Buddhist way of coming to know ultimate reality is to produce a
condition of being in which reality can be perceived directly. It is because the
The Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikaya), 2 vols., trans. Robert
Chalmers (London: Oxford University Press, 1926-1927), 2:280.
105 Ibid.
106 The Majjhima Nikaya, 1:297.
104
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reality to be known is "other" than that which is ordinarily known that the
process of meditation-sati, samadhi, jhana and upekkhii-is undergone. The
cognizing apparatus must be transformed since, indeed, to reach nibbiina involves a total transformation of consciousness and being.
The process of meditation described in the Pali suttas provides the proper
context for a discussion of Buddhist epistemology. Epistemology in Buddhism
is basically a soteriological and not a philosophical problem. To understand
the Theravada view of knowledge ( vinniina and panna) demands a serious
study of the structure of Buddhist meditation. This essay has attempted such
a study. It has argued that within the progressive refinement of consciousness
developed in the Buddhist meditative process, discriminating and analytical
modes of knowledge played a decisive role, both in terms of understanding the
true nature of things as well as in producing a state of detachment. It has
further argued that meditation leads to a state of consciousness in which only
a nondiscriminating mode of knowledge is appropriate. Such knowledge might
be labeled mystical or intuitive but, finally, as the texts themselves point out,
it is without any proper designation ( animittii).
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